the emancipation of slaves. The progress fostered by this revolution would wither away with the end of Reconstruction.
As Davis acknowledges, Inhuman Bondage is "not a comprehensive or encyclopedic survey" (2). It does, however, provide a compelling narrative that will attract a wide variety of readers and offers a solid foundation for the any course on slavery.
CHARLES R. FOY Eastern Illinois University
Thomas J. McGuire. The Philadelphia Campaign: Brandywine and the Fall of Philadelphia, Volume One. (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2006. Pp. 420, notes, glossary, bibliography, index. Cloth, $34.95.) It had been a very near thing in the winter of 1776. With enlistments coming to an end and a disastrous defense of New York and New Jersey pointing to an early end to the Continental Army, General George Washington managed a reprieve for his army with audacious albeit operationally marginal victories at Trenton in December 1776 and Princeton in January 1777. The war would go on with each side seeking to find a decision to the conflict whether it be by force of arms or stroke of pen. Thomas J. McGuire, in his masterful narrative history of the Philadelphia Campaign of 1777, paints an exceptionally detailed picture of the people and events of the campaign, missing little of importance along the way.
Sir William Howe sought in the summer of 1777 to decide the war either through the capture of Philadelphia or the destruction of the rebel army in its defense. Washington understood Howe's intent for the disposition of the British army hinted at an overland campaign through New Jersey. Washington positioned his own army to threaten Howe's flanks. Realizing that there was little he could do to rid himself of this threat, Howe pulled back to the safety of New York and in doing so, left Washington with a quandary. With British forces gathering in Canada poised to move south by way of Lake Champlain and the Hudson River, did Howe now intend to make the main effort the isolation and reduction of rebellious New England? Was Charleston, South Carolina the new target using the Royal Navy for transport? Or did a water approach to Philadelphia by way of the Delaware River or the Chesapeake Bay offer another way to the rebel capital?
Howe elected the latter with an overland march from Head of Elk to the city's south side as his plan of attack. Although slow to discern his enemy's plans, Washington moved to block Howe, setting his army along the eastern shore of Brandywine Creek astride the main road from Chester to Philadelphia.
McGuire's depiction of the battle that follows makes for superb reading. Having seen the devastation poorly armed colonial militia were able to inflict at Bunker Hill (Breed's Hill), Howe elected to split his forces ordering Lieutenant Wilhelm von Knyphausen to move his division east from Kennett Square toward the Chad's Ford crossing of the Brandywine. Knyphausen's job was to fix Washington's forces in place while Lord Charles Earl Cornwallis took two divisions and moved to flank the Continentals by way of Trimble's and Jeffries's Fords. Washington's light dragoons failed to discern Cornwallis's move in a timely manner with the result that Cornwallis was across the western most branch of the Brandywine as the first shots rang out west of Chad's Ford. Cornwallis was well on his way toward Washington's largely unguarded right flank.
Knyphausen's men did their job well. His forward elements engaged first light dragoons, then Continental light infantry driving them back across the Brandywine. Knyphausen then brought his division to a stop, electing to allow his artillery to lob rounds into the rebel positions. Continental artillery responded in kind. Washington, now in receipt of somewhat conflicting reports of British forces conducting a flank march elected to seize the initiative and ordered Sullivan to attack Knyphausen's positions via Brinton's Ford.
McGuire argues this was the critical moment of the battle. Had Washington committed earlier to an all out attack on Knyphausen, he might well have smashed the Hessian with sufficient time to reconfigure his army in the event Howe did plan a flank attack. Instead, Sullivan received word that no British forces appeared to be west of the Brandywine. Sullivan passed the report along to Washington who, thinking that Howe was coaxing him into a trap, countermanded Sullivan's orders. Sullivan pulled his forces back across the Brandywine and had been not long in his position before Cornwallis brought his army in on Washington's right flank. Washington responded by shifting forces to the north but the move proved only partially successful. With Sullivan and later Nathanael Greene's divisions engaged against Burgoyne, Knyphausen resumed his attack pressuring Anthony Wayne's division. Slowly, the Continentals began to give with Sullivan's division breaking under the pressure. The fighting continued until dusk when Washington ordered a withdrawal toward Chester.
The battle had turned out nearly as Howe wished it to. He had once again bested Washington and the road to Philadelphia was now open, although the Continental army had again escaped destruction. Howe had been slow to pursue and Washington quick to run. Howe would march into Philadelphia on 26 September 1777 and occupy it until the following spring. Its fall hurt but did not cripple the patriot cause. Even in defeat, Washington sought an opportunity to turn the tables on Howe before the end of the campaign season. He would nearly do so at Germantown, the subject of the second volume in McGuire's history of the campaign.
The pros far outweigh the cons in this masterful work. McGuire's writing flows easily. More impressive is the author's command of source materials. A review of his bibliography and footnotes demonstrates that he has been to all of the major archival holdings in the United States as well as the United Kingdom. He has also employed the latest in secondary source materials. In terms of scope, this is no general's history of a campaign. Whether general or private, farm girl or Luthern minister, McGuire has woven their views of the campaign together, using logically based assumptions to account for the discrepancies in the primary documents. If there are problems with the volume, they are not major. His maps are good but not great. Perhaps a better cartographer would be in order should this go to another edition. There are a few minor irritants in the printed copy not the least of which was the decision on the part of the publisher to use a capital I instead of a 1 in any numerical entries. This too should be corrected in a second edition. Taken as a totality, this is the best account of Brandywine that I know of in print.
JOSEPH R. FISCHER US Army Command and General Staff College
Warren C. Robinson. Jeb Stuart and the Confederate Defeat at Gettysburg . (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007. Pp. xiii, 198, maps, illustrations, notes, bibliography, index. Cloth, $24.95.) As the 150 th anniversary of the battle of Gettysburg approaches, historians are already disseminating new interpretations of the events surrounding one of the most studied happenings of the American Civil War. In Jeb Stuart and the Confederate Defeat at Gettysburg , economics professor emeritus Warren C. Robinson seeks to renew one of the most debated controversies surrounding
